This paper analyzes a model in which a firm's compliance with regulation is monitored by a supervisor. The supervisor exerts costly, unobservable effort to raise his inspection intensity, which leads to moral hazard. A non-compliant firm may exert effort in avoidance to reduce the probability of sanction. The regulatory framework is such that inspections may be announced or unannounced. Our analysis derives novel results about the response of monitoring and avoidance to changes in inspection policies, as well as conditions under which a regulator who maximizes compliance prefers unannounced to announced inspections. When the supervisor is corruptible, unannounced inspections are susceptible to a tip-off from the supervisor to the firm in exchange for a bribe. To eliminate bribery, the regulator may reduce the frequency of inspections. However, in an example, we show that eliminating tipping-off may lead to lower compliance unless the supervisor's wage is raised.
Introduction
Regulators face a choice between inspecting the agents under their supervision continuously and implementing occasional inspections. For instance, a recent report by the non-profit organization Food and Water Watch discusses the controversy surrounding the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) inspection policies of meat packing plants. Currently the USDA continuously inspects the meat packing process by stationing inspectors at each plant every day. However, perhaps due to budget cuts, the USDA plans to discontinue this continuous inspection process and instead conduct occasional inspections. 1 The USDA asserts that this change will result in $250 million of direct savings for the industry and $30 million of savings in government expenditure. Although the USDA claims that food
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safety will not be affected by this change, consumer and environmental protection groups such as Food and Water Watch contest their claim and argue that continuous inspections are necessary in order to enforce food safety standards (Food and Water Watch 2011) . The debate surrounding the USDA's policy change suggests that even if continuous inspections maximize compliance, in most situations they will be too costly to implement. Indeed, a recent report on "Good regulatory practices" conducted for the World Bank states that blanket inspections of all facilities are usually impossible due to financial constraints (Jacobs and Cordova, 2005) . Thus, cost constraints place limits on the ability of the regulator to conduct continuous inspections.
When inspections are occasional rather than continuous the regulator faces a further choice between letting individuals know ahead of time when an inspection is forthcoming and conducting surprise inspections. For example, airlines conduct continuous inspections by checking every passenger's ticket before allowing them to board. In contrast the Maryland Transit Authority conducts occasional, unannounced (i.e. surprise) inspections for passengers who board the Baltimore light rail. 2 Intuition suggests that surprise inspections may be more effective because they enable the regulator to catch the violator off-guard. However, a potential problem with surprise inspections is that if some of the officials in the regulatory agency are corrupt, they may tip off non-compliant individuals in advance, thereby spoiling the surprise (Chin, 1999) . This tip-off will be particularly valuable to the individual if as a result he can more easily hide the evidence of his non-compliance.
There is evidence to suggest that corruption in the form of a tip-off may be a significant problem in regulatory settings. For example, the New York Department of Transportation conducts surprise inspections of school bus companies to test the road-worthiness of their buses. School-bus supervisors at the department of transportation in New York, however, were recently known to accept bribes from firms in exchange for informing them of an upcoming inspection. Firms were then able to hide the buses that were faulty in order to avoid being penalized. This story was recently reported in the New York Times. Furthermore, in a study dealing primarily with the accounting industry, Sanchirico (2006) also points to the empirical relevance of detecting avoidance efforts and the resulting social costs.
The effectiveness of the alternative inspection regimes described above, whether continuous or occasional, surprise or announced, will be further confounded by moral hazard if the regulator needs to hire inspectors who must exert costly and unobservable effort in order to carry the inspections. Thus, for example, although the TSA conducts continuous inspections, the actual probability of detecting violators will be lowered if TSA officers shirk.
The previous discussion raises several important questions regarding the optimal choice of an inspection regime when supervisory effort is non-contractible, firms can hide evidence,
and corruption can occur in the form of inspectors tipping off the firms they are hired to supervise. Specifically, under these circumstances an important question to address is whether a compliance maximizing regulator will prefer occasional or continuous inspections. Second, if inspections are occasional, should they be announced or unannounced? Third, how does bribery and tipping-off affect compliance under these different inspection regimes? Fourth, how does bribery affect the regulator's choice of inspection regimes (i.e. the frequency of inspections, and whether announced or surprise)? And, fifth what policies can the regulator employ in order to eliminate bribery, assuming that eliminating bribery is desirable?
To study these issues we develop a Principal-Supervisor-Agent model of inspection regimes where bribery and tipping-off can weaken the power of unannounced inspections. To our knowledge ours is the first paper to formally model tipping-off with bribery. In the model, the principal is a compliance maximizing regulator who must hire supervisors in order to inspect the agents or firms, and fine the ones that are found to be non-compliant. The regulator chooses the frequency of inspections, that is, whether inspections will be continuous or occasional, and whether the inspection regime will be announced or unannounced. Taking this regulatory environment as given, the firm and the supervisor then play a simultaneous move game in which the firm chooses its level of concealment (i.e. avoidance), while the supervisor chooses the level of monitoring effort. Following Malik (1990) , the probability of detecting a firm's non-compliance is increasing in monitoring effort and decreasing in the firm's level of avoidance. However, in contrast to Malik the regulator faces a moral hazard problem because the supervisor's monitoring effort is non-contractible. 3 Thus, our model distinguishes the probability of scheduling an inspection from the probability of successful detection, conditional on an inspection being scheduled.
We show that conflating the probability of detection with the probability of scheduling an inspection, along with the assumption of observable inspection effort that is retained in previous models, are not innocuous. Indeed, as a result of moral hazard, in our model the probability of detection will typically be less than one even when an inspection is scheduled. Thus, similar to Mookherjee and Png (1995) the regulator must rely on the supervisor's wage to influence the probability of successful inspection. Furthermore, another difference with previous models is our analysis of corruption, also made possible by the introduction of a supervisor susceptible to moral hazard.
When supervisors are incorruptible, we show that as long as the supervisor's equilibrium effort is sufficiently elastic with respect to an increase in the inspection frequency, a compliance maximizing regulator will implement a continuous inspection regime. Otherwise, a compliance maximizing regulator will choose to implement a surprise, occasional, inspection regime. If inspectors are corrupt, we show that whenever a compliance maximizing regulator prefers an unannounced inspection to an announced inspection regime, the firm will have an incentive to pay the supervisor a bribe in order to receive a tip-off. The payment of a bribe effectively converts an unannounced inspection regime into an announced regime and will always lower compliance. Thus, under an unannounced regime, bribery will generally prevent the regulator from achieving the desired level of compliance. Interestingly, we show that under some conditions the regulator can eliminate bribery by lowering the frequency with which inspections are conducted. Intuitively, lowering the frequency of inspections reduces the benefits of receiving a tip-off, thereby lowering the incentives for bribery. Thus, even when there are no penalties for bribery, bribery can be eliminated by choosing the appropriate frequency of inspections. Furthermore, we show that although inspections must be less frequent in order to eliminate bribery, under some conditions overall compliance may be raised compared to the regime that allows for corruption. However, in general it is not excluded that the regulator will always prefer to allow bribery. We provide numerical examples in which the frequency of inspections and the supervisor's wage act as substitutes in the expression for expected compliance. In this case, any level of compliance that would prevail under bribery can be achieved without bribery by lowering the frequency of inspections and raising the wage.
Our findings regarding the regulator's choice of inspection regimes are related to other recent studies. Lazear (2006) shows that from a regulatory standpoint, neither surprise nor announced inspections are unambiguously preferred. In Lazear's model, the nature of the optimal monitoring strategy, announced or unannounced, is driven by the responsiveness of the agent to an increase in the expected punishment for non-compliance. The less responsive the agent is, the more effective announced inspections are at inducing compliance because they guarantee that compliance does occur whenever an inspection is set to take place. Eeckhout et al. (2010) characterize the optimal monitoring strategy under a variety of objective functions for the regulator (crime minimization, undetected crime minimization, social welfare maximization). They show that for all three specifications of the regulator's objective, the optimal strategy may involve crackdowns, which consist in monitoring a specific subgroup of the population at a higher intensity than the general population. 4 In their model, crackdowns are always publicized, therefore within our context they are a form of announced inspections. Although Lazear (2006) and Eeckhout et al. (2010) study some of the issues that we raise, neither paper considers the effect of announced versus unannounced inspections on monitoring and avoidance efforts simultaneously or the role of bribery and tipping-off as we do in this paper. Furthermore, their models assume that the harm is completely reversible conditional on an inspection being scheduled. Although this may be applicable for driving behavior, i.e., drivers slow down in the vicinity of an officer, in the M A N U S C R I P T
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context of environmental or workplace inspections, reversing the harm caused by violations may be quite costly, if not impossible.
Our paper is also related to the literature on avoidance of law enforcement, which is reviewed in Sanchirico (2010) . In existing models of avoidance, such as Malik (1990) , Stanley (1995) , Langlais (2008) , Nussim and Tabbach (2009) or Tabbach (2010) , the regulator precommits to detection effort, which is thus perfect information at the time the agent chooses avoidance effort. In contrast, in our model if an inspection is scheduled, the supervisor and the agent simultaneously choose monitoring intensity and avoidance effort, respectively, which determines the probability of successful detection. 5 Therefore, introducing supervisor moral hazard allows us to separate the probability of scheduling an inspection, to which the regulator is precommitted, from the probability of successful detection, which is determined as the outcome of a simultaneous move game. 6 Finally, our paper is related to studies that use a mechanism design approach to modeling audit regimes (e.g. Border and Sobel, 1987; Mookherjee and Png, 1989; Chander and Wilde, 1998 in the context of tax compliance, or even Malik, 1993 and Damania, 2002 in the context of environmental regulation). In these models, the agent under supervision may misreport his true information, which is similar to hiding, but misreporting does not generate any direct costs. Also, because of the revelation principle, misreporting does not occur in equilibrium. In contrast, in the literature on avoidance which our paper contributes to, the act of concealing involves the outlay of real resources. 7 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and analyze the inspection game between the supervisor and the firm. We show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists under both unannounced and announced inspections. Section 3 studies inspections and compliance assuming that supervisors are incorruptible and taking the frequency of inspections as given. Section 4 studies the optimal inspection regime and the corresponding optimal inspection frequency under incorruptible supervisors. Section 5 introduces corruption in the form of a tip-off from the supervisor to the firm. We examine the feasibility of 5 Marjit at al. (2000) analyze the effect of bribery on compliance in a model with detection avoidance, but their model and research questions are quite different from ours. In particular, they assume that the supervisor must precommit to an effort level, after which a non-compliant agent that is detected by the supervisor decides whether or not to pay a bribe. Similar to Mookherjee and Png (1995) , a supervisor who receives a bribe does not report the agent to the authorities. Hence Marjit et al. (2000) do not consider bribery for a tip-off.
6 Malik (1990) and the articles cited above, which are extensions of his model, focus their attention on whether the optimal fine is maximal when agents engage in avoidance activities. Nussim and Tabbach (2009) show that raising fines or the probability of enforcement may actually increase crime when criminals engage in avoidance activities. These authors do not distinguish between announced and surprise inspections and how they relate to avoidance. Since our focus is on the optimal inspection regime under bribery and moral hazard, we do not discuss their findings in detail. 7 If a large informal sector exists, then another way to hide for non-compliant firms may be to leave the formal sector and join the informal sector (Méndez, 2014 ).
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corruption as a function of the frequency of inspections. Section 6 concludes.
The model
We consider a model in which a firm (F ) decides whether to comply with regulation or to be non-compliant. The firm receives a benefit g ≥ 0 from non-compliance and the benefit from compliance is normalized to zero. The firm's gain from non-compliance is private information, but the distribution of g, with density function φ(g) and cumulative distribution Φ(g) on support [0, g max ], is public information. If the firm is not compliant it also generates a negative externality or social harm of h > 0. A principal or regulator (P ) hires a supervisor (S) to monitor the firm's activities. The basic structure is identical to Malik (1990) except that we introduce a supervisor and an array of possible inspection regimes. For a firm that is non-compliant, the probability that the supervisor is able to provide verifiable evidence of the firm's violation is given by p(m, x). The variable m denotes the supervisor's choice of monitoring intensity and the variable x denotes the firm's avoidance effort. The firm's avoidance cost function is C F (x) = x and the supervisor's monitoring cost function is C S (m) = e(m). We make the following assumptions, which we justify below. Before commenting on each of the assumptions, we point out that for any given parameter a in the interval (0, 1], the function p(m, x) = m a m a +x a for m a + x a > 0 and p(0, 0) = 0, satisfies all assumptions on p(m, x). Point i. states that monitoring effort is required in order to raise the probability of a successful inspection above zero. Assumption ii. is a standard continuity and differentiability assumption. Assumptions iii. and iv. are intuitive and identical to Malik (1990) . The probability of a successful inspection decreases in avoidance effort and increases in supervisor effort. Also, there are diminishing marginal returns to each 6 A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T
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activity. Assumption v. is a commonly employed assumption made to guarantee that bestresponses are finite. Additional assumptions are required for the existence and uniqueness of an interior equilibrium. We spell out these assumptions before Lemma 1 below. Finally, vi. simply states that the production of verifiable evidence is costly and the supervisor's cost function is increasing at a non-decreasing rate. In the analysis, we often set e(m) = m. We make no specific assumption on the cross-partial derivative of p(m, x) except for the requirement that it be non-zero for a subset of (m, x) values. In contrast, Malik (1990) assumes ∂ 2 p(m, x) ∂m∂x = 0 for simplicity, while Langlais (2008) assumes ∂ 2 p(m, x) ∂m∂x < 0. In our model, if ∂ 2 p(m, x) ∂m∂x = 0 for every m and x as in Malik (1990) , then a player's best-response is constant and does not depend on the other player's action. Therefore a zero cross-partial would suppress any strategic interaction between the supervisor and the firm. Since the sign of the cross partial is critical to the strategic interactions between the supervisor and the firm, it is useful to define the two cases of complements and substitutes. The statement below refers to local properties of p(m, x). It also extends the definition of substitutes at a point to that of global substitutes. The strategic variables (m, x) cannot be complements globally because p(0, x) = 0 for every x (see Malik, 1990 ).
Definition 1. Monitoring intensity m and avoidance effort x are substitutes at (m, x) if
They are global substitutes if the strict inequality holds for every (m, x). Instead, if the above cross-partial derivative is strictly greater than zero at (m, x), then monitoring intensity and avoidance effort are complements.
We may interpret the case with complements as one where an increase in hiding encourages the supervisor to exert more monitoring effort. In the case with substitutes, an increase in avoidance discourages the supervisor from exerting more effort.
Following an inspection, if the firm is not compliant and the supervisor is able to provide verifiable evidence of the violation, the firm must pay a fine f , where f > 0. In this case, the supervisor receives a wage equal to rf , where r is in the interval (0, 1]. If the inspection is unsuccessful, both the fine and the wage are equal to zero. This fine and wage structure is due to Mookherjee and Png (1995) . We treat r and f as exogenous policy instruments, except in Section 5.4 where we discuss the choice of r in the face of bribery.
Inspection regimes
We focus on two alternative inspection regimes, announced (A) and unannounced (U) inspections, although our model accommodates an array of possible regimes. Formally, with probability σ, the regulator schedules an inspection (I) and with probability 1 − σ, no inspection is scheduled (NI). That is, the true probability of an inspection is σ. The firm 7 then receives a signal θ out of the set {i, ni, ∅}, wherein Pr(θ = i I) = Pr(θ = ni NI) = q and Pr(θ = ∅ I) = Pr(θ = ∅ NI) = 1 − q. In regime A, inspections are announced so q = 1. In contrast, in regime U, inspections are unannounced so q = 0. 8 Under an announced regime the firm's posterior belief about an inspection is equal to one when it receives signal i and zero when it receives signal ni. Under an unannounced regime, the firm never receives a signal (i.e., it receives ∅ with probability one) so that its posterior belief is equal to the prior (σ, 1 − σ). Finally, both the inspection regime and the corresponding frequency are common knowledge. Given this structure, the timing of the game is as follows.
0. The regulator announces A or U with its corresponding frequency σ.
1. The firm chooses compliance or non-compliance. The supervisor learns whether or not the firm is compliant, but this information is unverifiable.
2a. Suppose the regime is A. Then Nature's draw, I or NI, becomes public information.
Regardless of the draw, if the firm is compliant, then no further decisions are made and all players earn zero. If the firm is non-compliant, then if I was drawn, the supervisor and the firm simultaneously choose m and x, respectively. If NI was drawn, the game ends and the firm's payoff is equal to g, the supervisor earns zero and the regulator earns −h.
2b. Suppose the regime is U. Then if the firm is compliant, no further decisions are made and all players earn zero. Otherwise the firm and supervisor first decide whether or not to enter into a corrupt agreement. In this agreement the firm pays a bribe and the supervisor promises to reveal to the firm whether I or NI has been drawn by the regulator.
2bi. The supervisor learns Nature's draw, I or NI, but the firm does not.
2bii. In the absence of a corrupt agreement, the supervisor and the firm simultaneously choose m and x, respectively. At this stage, the two players' beliefs differ. The supervisor knows the true state of the world, but the firm believes an inspection occurs with probability σ.
2biii. In the presence of a corrupt agreement, the firm pays the agreed upon bribe and we assume that the supervisor truthfully reveals the information. Thus, the information received by the firm amounts to making the U regime an A regime and point 2a above applies.
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3. In the final stage all fines and payments are transferred.
In Section 3, we derive preliminary results assuming that the frequency of inspections σ is exogenously given, but in Section 4, we characterize the compliance maximizing regime when both the type of inspections (announced vs. unannounced) and σ are choice variables for the regulator. Under either an announced or an unannounced regime, we refer to the simultaneous game in which the supervisor and a non-compliant firm choose m and x as the inspection subgame.
Inspection subgame equilibrium
In this section, we solve the inspection subgame between a non-compliant firm and the supervisor. At this point in the game, if a bribe was exchanged it is a sunk transfer so that it does not affect the optimal choices of monitoring and avoidance. First consider the supervisor's behavior. When choosing m, the supervisor knows that an inspection is going to occur. Hence, for given x, the supervisor's choice of m is independent of the inspection regime and the value of σ. Specifically, the supervisor chooses m to maximize his expected payoff
To derive the supervisor's best-response, first assume x > 0. Under Assumption 1, a solution to the supervisor's maximization problem exists, as we show below. The first order condition at an interior solution is
If the boundary condition lim m→0 ∂p(m,x) ∂m rf > e ′ (0) holds, then (1) has a unique, strictly positive solution. The second order condition is satisfied because
If the boundary condition does not hold, the solution to the supervisor's problem is m = 0. Therefore the FOC defines a best-response function m * (x) for every strictly positive level of avoidance effort. When m * (x) > 0, its shape depends on whether m and x are complements or substitutes because
may not be continuous at m = 0, the supervisor's bestresponse will not always exist because it could be optimal for him to set an infinitesimally small m > 0. We now turn to the firm's behavior, which depends on the value of θ, the signal it has received. It is useful to split the analysis between the announced and unannounced regimes. First, consider the unannounced regime. In this case the firm never receives a signal. The firm's posterior belief is that an inspection will occur with probability σ and no inspection 9
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will occur with probability 1 − σ. The firm chooses x to minimize its expected loss
If σ = 0, then x = 0 is optimal. Also, if m = 0, then x = 0 is optimal. Now assume σ > 0 and m > 0. We make the following assumption The first order condition at an interior solution to the firm's expected loss minimization problem is
If the boundary condition −σ ∂p(m,0) ∂x f > 1 holds, then (2) has a unique, strictly positive solution. The second order condition is satisfied because −σ
If the boundary condition does not hold, the solution to the firm's problem is x = 0. Therefore the FOC defines a best-response function x * U (m) for every positive level of monitoring effort. Assumption 2 guarantees that for every vector of parameters, there exists an m for which the boundary condition does hold. When x * U (m) is strictly positive, its shape depends on whether m and x are complements or substitutes because
Now consider an announced regime. In this case, the probability of receiving the correct signal is equal to one. If the signal is ni, the firm does not do anything because it knows there will not be an inspection. If the signal is i, the firm knows there will indeed be an inspection. In this case again, the best response to m = 0 is x = 0. Otherwise, the firm chooses x to minimize
which yields a first order condition that is identical to the above, but with σ = 1. With the best-responses under unannounced and announced regimes now characterized, we show that under the following additional assumption on the players' best-response functions, a unique equilibrium exists and in equilibrium, both the supervisor and the firm exert strictly positive effort. 9 Assumption 3. For every j ∈ {U, A} and σ ∈ (0, 1], there exists am such that
Assumption 3 has an intuitive interpretation. Suppose we focus on the set of avoidance effort levels that are a best-response to some monitoring effort level. Then the first part of the assumption guarantees that the supervisor has a strictly positive best-response to some x in that set. Hence best-responses may cross at some m > 0. The second part of the assumption turns out to be sufficient for x = 0 not to arise in equilibrium. Indeed, if the condition holds and the supervisor uses his best-response to x = 0, then the firm will deviate to some x > 0. For the monitoring probability given by p(m, x) = m α m α +x α if m α +x α > 0 and p(0, 0) = 0, where α satisfies 0 < α ≤ 1, and a linear cost of monitoring effort, it is straightforward to show that the first part of the assumption holds. Note that for such p(m, x) and e(m), m * (0) does not exist, so that the second part of the assumption is irrelevant. Lemma 1. Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then for every j ∈ {U, A} and σ ∈ (0, 1], the inspection game between the supervisor and a non-compliant firm has a unique Nash equilibrium (m j , x j ) and in equilibrium, x j > 0 and m j > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The Nash equilibrium in monitoring and avoidance effort characterized in this section adds to existing results in the literature on avoidance. For instance, Malik (1990) and Langlais (2008) assume that the regulator publicly commits to a level of monitoring intensity, after which the agent invests in avoidance. In our model, there is imperfect information regarding both the supervisor's monitoring effort and the firm's avoidance effort so that the appropriate game of inspection and avoidance is one with simultaneous moves. In the following section, we formally examine the implications of this game form for the behavior of the supervisor and the firm.
Before we proceed, we introduce some useful notation. Assuming that the firm is noncompliant and before an inspection is scheduled, we write Π U = σ[p(m U , x U )rf − e(m U )] for the supervisor's equilibrium expected payoff and Λ U = σp(m U , x U )f + x U for the firm's expected loss under an unannounced regime. For clarity, we sometimes write m U and x U as functions of σ. The equilibrium pair is then (m U (σ), x U (σ)). Under an announced regime, the supervisor's equilibrium expected payoff is 10 In the next two sections, we assume that the supervisor is incorruptible. An incorruptible supervisor does not accept bribes or give tips. Thus, the analysis below provides a baseline to which we compare the outcome with corruptible supervisors.
Response to policy changes with an incorruptible supervisor
In this section, we assume σ is exogenous, which allows us to obtain some preliminary insight into how the regulator's policy will affect monitoring effort, avoidance effort and A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T
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compliance. Moreover, when analyzing the inspection subgame, there is no loss of generality in assuming that σ is exogenous since the supervisor and the firm take it as given. 11
Monitoring and avoidance
Under an unannounced regime, whenever it is strictly positive, the firm's best-response function has the following relationships with σ and f : ∂x * (m) ∂σ > 0 and ∂x * (m) ∂f > 0 for every m.
Therefore a strengthening of the inspection regime, either through an increase in the frequency of inspections or an increase in the fine, will shift the avoidance best-response upward.
Under an announced regime, the firm's best response function is independent of σ, but it shifts upward if the fine is raised. Similarly, for the supervisor, whenever the best-response is strictly positive, the following holds under both unannounced and announced regimes
Therefore, an increase in the supervisor's reward, either through an increase in the reward or the fine, shifts his best-response upward. Lemma 2 characterizes the response of the equilibrium levels of monitoring and avoidance (m U , x U ) and (m A , x A ) to changes in the policy parameters r, f and σ. Proof. See the Appendix.
With respect to σ, the intuition for the above result is easily visualized in Figure 1 . Consider an unannounced regime. As σ increases, the supervisor's best-response does not change, but the firm's best-response shifts to the right. As can be seen in the figure, in the case with complements (substitutes), the equilibrium level of monitoring m U increases (decreases). But in both cases, the equilibrium level of avoidance effort x U goes up. When σ = 1, then the first order condition of the firm is identical under both regimes, therefore, the equilibrium level of monitoring and hiding is the same under both regimes. That is, m U (1) = m A and x U (1) = x A .
Compliance
To study the impact of various regimes on compliance, recall our assumption that if the firm is compliant, then it receives a gain of 0. In contrast, if the firm is not compliant, then it receives a private gain of g and it generates social harm of h. It follows that in an unannounced regime the firm will choose to be non-compliant if and only if
In an announced regime the firm will choose to be non-compliant if and only if
When σ = 0, then there are no inspections and therefore, no compliance. When σ = 1 then note that the firm's best-response is the same under an unannounced regime as under an announced regime. Since the supervisor's monitoring intensity is independent of σ, 13 the level of compliance will be the same under both regimes. In Proposition 1 below, we characterize the impact of increasing the frequency of inspections σ on the level of compliance g n , n ∈ {U, A}. In the proposition, we let ǫ i j denote the elasticity of a variable or parameter i with respect to j. 
Consider an announced inspection regime. For every σ > 0 the level of compliance g A is strictly increasing in σ.
Proposition 1 shows that when monitoring intensity and avoidance effort are substitutes, it may be the case that lowering the frequency of unannounced inspections results in greater compliance. Compliance decreases with the frequency of inspections because raising the 14
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frequency encourages the firm to invest in greater avoidance. Since avoidance and monitoring are substitutes, it also leads the supervisor to reduce monitoring effort. Consequently, because x rises and m falls, the probability of detection p(m, x) falls. When these endogenous effects of σ on m and x dominate the effect of raising σ itself, the joint probability of detection (σp(m, x)) falls and so does compliance. Interestingly, this result is related to Hanna and Oliva's (2010) empirical finding that inspections may have a strong effect on pollution abatement in industries which are infrequently inspected. Proposition 1 also shows that the effect of an increase in σ on the probability of detection p(m, x) is generally ambiguous under an unannounced regime but not under an announced regime. Thus, unannounced and announced regimes differ substantially in the way that compliance is affected by a change in the frequency of inspections. This difference has an important implication for the characterization of the optimal policy, as we show in Proposition 2 and discuss further in the next section.
Before we turn to the characterization of the optimal inspection regime and frequency combination, we compare unannounced to announced inspections for a fixed frequency of inspections. Lazear (2006) examines whether a compliance maximizing regulator will prefer announced or unannounced inspections for an exogenously determined inspection frequency. In his paper, the exogenous inspection frequency is the ratio of the number of inspectors to the number of potential violators. Arguably, while inspection regimes (announced or unannounced) can be changed almost instantaneously, the number of inspectors cannot. Thus, in light of his analysis we provide the following corollary to Proposition 1, which holds for given σ ∈ (0, 1).
Corollary 1. For every given σ ∈ (0, 1), if monitoring intensity and avoidance effort are global substitutes, then compliance is higher under unannounced inspections than under announced inspections. Otherwise, compliance may be higher under an announced regime.
Proof. See the Appendix. This result is intuitive. Suppose monitoring and avoidance effort are global substitutes. If the frequency of inspections is equal to one, then compliance is the same under announced and unannounced inspections. As σ decreases to some σ < 1, m A and x A are unaffected because under announced inspections, neither the firm's, nor the supervisor's behavior depend on the frequency of inspections. However, under unannounced inspections because the cost of hiding is higher, the firm's incentives to invest in hiding is lower so that its best response shifts downward. Since the choice variables are global substitutes, this decrease in avoidance effort raises the supervisor's incentives to invest in monitoring. As shown in Proposition 1, equilibrium monitoring goes up and hiding effort falls. Hence, the probability of detection goes up. It follows that compliance is higher under unannounced inspections. These results
15
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can be illustrated using Figure 1 . In general, however, if m and x are neither global substitutes or complements we cannot rule out that for some subsets of (0, 1) compliance is higher under announced inspections than under unannounced inspections.
Optimal inspections with an incorruptible supervisor
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that the regulator's objective is to choose the regime, A or U, and the inspection frequency σ, that minimize the expected social harm. That is,
w.r.t. j ∈ {U, A} and σ ∈ [0, 1].
Since h is fixed, the regulator will behave so as to maximize the probability of compliance by maximizing the threshold g j . For simplicity, we refer to g j as the level of compliance.
Proposition 2. Assume that a solution to the regulator's compliance maximization problem (4) exists. Then the optimal regime is either σ * = 1 (continuous inspections) or unannounced inspections with
σ * < 1. If σ * < 1
, then it must be the case that monitoring intensity and avoidance effort are substitutes and that the elasticity condition (3) holds with an equality.
Proposition 2 derives conditions under which a compliance-maximizing regulator using unannounced inspections optimally sets σ strictly below one, even if raising σ is costless. In contrast, if monitoring intensity and avoidance effort are complements, or they are substitutes but the probability of a successful inspection is always inelastic with respect to the supervisor's effort and σ (that is, (3) holds with a strict inequality), then continuous inspections with σ = 1 are optimal. It should be noted that a sufficient condition for σ * < 1 is that compliance is decreasing in σ at σ = 1, which is the case if the elasticity condition in equation (4) is violated at σ = 1. 12 In the existing literature, Lazear (2006) finds that the choice between announced and unannounced inspections depends on the responsiveness of the agent being monitored to changes in expected fines. In the context of his model responsiveness to incentives refers to the effect of the expected fine on the decision to comply. Lazear does not consider avoidance
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effort. Furthermore, in his paper raising the frequency of inspections, by say, increasing the number of police on the road, always leads to greater compliance. 13 The result in Proposition 2 should also be distinguished from Langlais (2008) . He assumes that monitoring and avoidance are substitutes, but in his model the regulator must precommit to monitoring intensity before the firm chooses x. Furthermore monitoring intensity is observable, so that there is no supervisor moral hazard and the firm acts as a Stackelberg follower. In such a sequential game, compliance always increases in the probability of an inspection, so that a compliance maximizing regulator will always choose σ = 1. In contrast, in our model compliance does not always increase with σ even when monitoring and avoidance are substitutes. Therefore, Proposition 2 above highlights the importance of separating the frequency of inspections (σ) from the probability of getting caught p(m, x).
Finally, it may appear that once we restrict our attention to optimal inspection frequencies, announced inspections are a special case of unannounced inspections with σ = 1. However, as Corollary 1 shows, the two regimes differ substantially for a given σ < 1. Indeed, compliance under announced inspections could be higher or lower than compliance under unannounced inspections.
Before we turn to the analysis of bribery, we note that the above discussion assumes that the regulator maximizes compliance and does not include the supervisor's cost of effort, the cost of hiding or the difference between private benefit and social harm from non-compliance into his objective function. Lazear (2006) also focuses on compliance maximization. Clearly, a welfare maximizing regulator acting like a social planner may choose not to set σ equal to one even when monitoring and avoidance efforts are complements.
Inspections and compliance with a corruptible supervisor
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that supervisors are corruptible in that they accept bribes in exchange for warning the firm when an inspection is scheduled. It is important to note that this form of bribery can only occur in an unannounced regime because there is asymmetric information between the supervisor and the firm regarding an upcoming inspection. 13 There are several key differences between Lazear (2006) and our paper. First, under announced inspections, the agent in Lazear's model decides whether or not to comply after the announcement was made. Therefore, the agent never complies when the regulator announces that no inspection will occur. In our model, the agent or firm commits to a compliance level before learning whether or not an inspection will occur. However the regulator's announcement affects the firm's decision with respect to its level of avoidance. Second, in Lazear (2006) an announced inspection may be viewed as a (compound) lottery with probability q of a P q expected fine and a probability 1 − q of no fine. An unannounced inspection is simply a lottery with an expected fine of P . In other words, under announced inspections, incentives are concentrated over a subset of activities of mass q, while under unannounced inspections, incentives are evenly spread out across all activities. In our paper, other things constant, the expected fine p(m, x)f is the same under announced and unannounced inspections. A consequence is that x A (σ) ≥ x U (σ) for every σ. Equilibrium avoidance effort is always greater in the announced regime than in the unannounced regime.
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The gains from bribery
To understand how the incentives for bribery relate to the principal's choice of an inspection regime, suppose the principal is a compliance maximizing regulator who strictly prefers to implement an unannounced regime with frequency σ (see Proposition 2) . In this case, g U > g A or equivalently Λ U > Λ A , holds. However, this implies that the firm's willingness to pay a bribe for a tip is greater than zero because the tip-off essentially converts the unannounced regime to an announced regime, which yields a lower loss. Hence, whenever the regulator prefers a unannounced regime to an announced regime, the firm will also want to pay a bribe to receive a tip. Therefore, we conduct our analysis of bribery assuming that
Under bribery any unannounced regime with σ < 1 effectively becomes an announced regime. Thus, aside from the bribe, which is a lump-sum side transfer, the firm and the supervisor's behavior and their expected payoffs in the inspection subgame under an unannounced regime with bribery will be identical to those under an announced regime. Specifically, with the tip-off the firm behaves as if the inspection regime were announced. Thus, under bribery a firm expects to gain
Similarly, under bribery the supervisor expects to gain
Bribery will occur only when both the supervisor and the firm can gain from it. Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for bribery is that their joint profit is positive, or
Thus, bribery is feasible if and only if the previous inequality is satisfied. For simplicity in the remainder of the paper we assume that e(m) = m. When the cost of monitoring intensity is linear, the inequality G(σ) > 0 simplifies to
The intuition behind equation (5) is straightforward. For bribery to be feasible, it must lead to a sufficiently large decrease in either expected avoidance costs (from x U to σx A ) or
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the supervisor's monitoring costs (from m U to m A ) or the probability of being fined (from p(m U , x U ) to p(m A , x A )).
Bribery and the frequency of inspections
The above arguments suggest that the firm's motivation to pay a bribe may stem partly from its desire to lower its expected cost of avoidance. Specifically, when inspections are unannounced, the firm is forced to incur x regardless of whether an inspection occurs. Thus, by paying a bribe to receive a tip-off, the firm only has to incur x when an inspection is scheduled. Since x U is increasing in σ, lowering σ will reduce the firm's avoidance cost. Thus, the regulator may be able to lower or even eliminate the firm's incentives for bribery by lowering σ. The following proposition formally examines the conditions under which the principal can use the frequency of inspections σ in order to prevent corruption. 
then there exists a σ such that for σ ∈ (0, σ], bribery is not feasible.
Proposition 3 suggests that there are two reasons for unannounced inspections with an interior σ. First, as we show in Section 4.2, unannounced inspections are used when the supervisor's monitoring effort and avoidance effort are substitutes and the supervisor responds strongly to incentives. Our analysis of corruption suggests that there is a second reason for decreasing the frequency of inspections to σ < 1. Specifically, choosing σ < 1 can lower x U and reduce the incentives for bribery.
To examine the result in Proposition 3 more transparently, we consider an example where p(m, x) = m m+x if m + x > 0 and p(0, 0) = 0. Note that the chosen p(m, x) and e(m) satisfy Assumptions 1 to 3. Therefore a unique equilibrium exists with x j > 0 and m j > 0 for j ∈ {U, A}. 16 We calculate the equilibrium of the inspection subgame under unannounced 15 Interestingly, it is straightforward to show that for bribery to be eliminated in a neighborhood of σ = 0, avoidance effort x U must go to zero as the frequency of inspections goes to zero. Therefore, this assumption is a necessary condition for the proposition to hold. 16 For this probability of success, the cross partial derivative
is positive if m > x and negative if m < x. Thus, the strategic variables m and x are not global substitutes and the best responses are non-monotonic.
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and announced inspections, the firm and the supervisor's expected payoffs and the gains from bribery G(σ). Figure 2 shows G(σ) for four values of r. For r sufficiently large, the gains from bribery become negative for σ below a certain cutoff. Thus, by reducing the frequency of inspections σ, bribery may be eliminated. 
Bribery and compliance
Proposition 3 only shows that there are conditions under which lowering σ can eliminate bribery. However, from a policy standpoint the key question is the impact of bribery on compliance when bribery is feasible. The actual level of compliance will depend on the size of the bribe. Thus, in order to determine the level of compliance we first need to identify the set of feasible bribes. Any bribe that the firm is willing to pay must satisfy Λ A + B ≤ Λ U . Therefore, the largest feasible bribe is given by
Similarly, any bribe that the supervisor is willing to accept must satisfy Π A + B ≥ Π U . Therefore, the smallest feasible bribe is given by
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The set of feasible bribes is [B, B] and if B > B, then this set is non-empty. Of course, the requirement that B > B is equivalent to satisfying inequality (5) . Again, it is important to note that by definition, any bribe in [B, B] is small enough to satisfy Λ A +B ≤ Λ U , where the left-hand side is simply the compliance level under bribery. Thus, any feasible bribe will also weakly lower compliance and if the principal chooses not to eliminate bribery, compliance will be also lowered.
The exact impact of bribery on compliance will depend on the size of the bribe. Most formulations of bribery assume that the actual size of the bribe is determined as the outcome of a bargaining game. Typically, the Nash bargaining solution is employed. Accordingly, let α ∈ [0, 1] be the firm's bargaining power. Then, assuming non-negative bribes, the bribe is given by 17 B α = max{αB + (1 − α)B, 0}, and for some regime σ where bribery is feasible, the level of compliance is
As in the case with honest supervisors, the regulator chooses the frequency that maximizes compliance and thus minimizes the expected social harm. When does bribery affect the regulator's optimal choice of σ? This will depend on the optimal frequency with honest supervisors. When supervisors are not corruptible, recall that the optimal frequency of inspections could be σ * = 1, that is the regulator may use continuous inspections. In this case, the fact that supervisors are corruptible does not affect the optimal frequency since bribery for a tip-off is obviously not feasible when σ = 1. In the presence of corruptible supervisors, the optimal frequency will change only if the optimal regime in the absence of corruption is unannounced inspections, σ * is interior and G(σ * ) > 0.
In general, the optimal frequency is the solution to the following problem
where ½ B is an indicator function which is equal to 1 if G(σ) > 0 and to 0 otherwise. The above compliance objective function is continuous except possibly at σ = 0. As in Section 4 where we analyze optimal compliance with honest supervisors, for convenience, we assume that a maximizer σ * * exists, which may be either interior or a corner solution such that σ * * = 1. If this optimal frequency is such that G(σ * * ) > 0, then we say that the regulator tolerates bribery. Otherwise, we say that the regulator eliminates bribery.
The following proposition specifies conditions under which bribery is tolerated. Since we are interested in whether bribery is tolerated, recall that tipping-off can only occur in unannounced regimes with σ * < 1. Proposition 2 shows that an unannounced regime is chosen only when m and x are substitutes and the condition for an interior solution is satisfied. We shall assume that these conditions are met, otherwise, the regulator will choose an announced regime and the problem of bribery will be irrelevant. 
for every σ ′ such that G(σ ′ ) > 0. Because a frequency σ satisfying these conditions does not necessarily exist, it follows that tolerating bribery could be optimal regardless of the firm's bargaining power.
Proposition 4 shows that the regulator finds it optimal to tolerate bribery if the firm's bargaining power is low. Surprisingly, it may in fact never be optimal to eliminate bribery if doing so entails a large distortion of the frequency of inspections. If the regulator tolerates bribery, then the official inspection regime is unannounced inspections, but the tip-off turns this regime into announced inspections and the corruptible supervisor earns the bribe. 18 Characterizing the optimal frequency of inspections with corruptible supervisors would require more structure on the payoff functions. Consider the example in Section 5.2 and assume r < 1. Then in the absence of bribery, the compliance level in an unannounced regime is given by g U = (2 σ+r)f rσ (σ+r)
2
, which is strictly increasing in σ. Hence compliance is maximized at σ * = 1 and bribery is not a problem if σ is unconstrained. While this example yields a corner solution, it lends itself well to extending the analysis to changes in both the frequency of inspections and the supervisor's reward, which is the focus of the next section.
The role of the supervisor's reward
So far, we have taken r as given. Using Lemma 2 and the envelope theorem, it is straightforward to show that in the absence of bribery, compliance increases with r. Therefore, a regulator facing absolutely no constraint on his choice of r would set r = 1. Of course, this corner solution may not occur if bribery is feasible because the feasibility of bribery and the bribe level itself are affected by changes in r. In general, it is not excluded that increasing r may worsen the effect of bribery on compliance. However, in the example from Section 5.2, r does have a negative effect on the feasibility of bribery, as illustrated by the diagram in Figure 3 . In the figure, the upward sloping dotted line shows the boundary G(σ, r) = 0. This line characterizes all the (σ, r) combinations where the joint profit from bribery is zero. Note that for all (σ, r) that are to the northwest of this line, bribery is not feasible.
To extend the analysis to a case where the regulator is able to choose both σ and r, we plot compliance indifference curves (henceforth, indifference curves) in (σ, r) space under the three regimes: unannounced, announced, and bribery. Figure 3 shows the indifference curves for the case with f = 1 and the level of compliance g j = 0.3, for j = {A, U, B}. It is straightforward to show that for this example the indifference curves under the three regimes are strictly convex. Three characteristics of the graph should be noted. First, compliance is increasing in the north-easterly direction. That is, for any regime, increasing both r and σ increases compliance. Second, at σ = 1 there is no operational difference between the three regimes, therefore, the same level of compliance can be achieved by the same r. Consequently, all three indifference curves intersect at σ = 1. Third, for σ > 0, the indifference curves for the U regime are below and to the left of the indifference curves for the A regime. If the bribe B = B, then the indifference curve for the B regime is identical to that of the U regime.
In this example, an unconstrained regulator would set both the frequency and the reward equal to one whether or not supervisors are corruptible. Therefore we consider a case in which the regulator faces some exogenously given constraint on σ and r. The argument below is compatible with a number of formulations of a budget constraint restricting the regulator's choice of σ and r, assuming that inspections are costly to set up (as they would be if they entailed administrative costs). The figure helps to clarify how corruption affects the relationship between compliance and the policy variables σ and r in the context of this example. When the supervisor is corruptible and bribery is feasible, then for a given reward r, reaching a specific level of compliance requires a higher σ than with an honest supervisor. Indeed, the gray indifference curve lies above the black indifference curve. Furthermore, with corruptible supervisors, compliance indifference curves are kinked. This is because in the region where bribery is not feasible, the indifference curve coincides with that for the U regime, but in the region where bribery is feasible, the indifference curve coincides with that for the regime with bribery. Hence there is a kink on the boundary of the bribery-free set, as shown by point A. In other words, when bribery is feasible, the indifference curve at that point is flatter and the marginal rate of substitution of σ for r is lower than they would be if the supervisor was honest. For this reason, a compliance-maximizing regulator facing a budget constraint that induces a tradeoff between σ and r is more likely to choose a lower σ and a higher r when the supervisor is corruptible than when he is honest. Due to the kink at points such as point A, it should be clear that the following scenario is possible. The regulator's optimal choice with honest supervisors is in the interior of the bribery-free set (say point B, where g U > 0.3), but for the same parameter values, the optimal choice with corruptible supervisors is at the kink (point A). In this case, the regulator's response to corruption is to lower σ and raise r in order to prevent bribery.
Conclusion
A number of countries have either recently reformed the way inspections are conducted by their regulatory agencies or have proposed such reforms (Coolidge, 2006; Federal Register, 2012) . The purported goal of these reforms is to improve the efficiency of inspection regimes. As the prior literature has noted, an important issue to consider when designing an inspection regime is whether agents can conceal the proscribed activity, since concealment weakens the effectiveness of inspections. We add to this literature by showing that supervisor moral hazard and concealment activities affect the optimal inspection regime, that is, whether the principal chooses to implement an announced or unannounced regime. Specifically, when the supervisor's elasticity of effort with respect to the frequency of inspections is large, then the compliance maximizing regime involves continuous, announced inspections. However, 24
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when this elasticity is low, then the compliance maximizing regime involves occasional, unannounced inspections. Our paper also shows that the possibility of concealment creates opportunities for bribery and tipping-off when monitoring effort is non-contractible and supervisors are corruptible. That is, when concealment is feasible, the firm has an incentive to bribe the supervisor in exchange for a tip-off since this enables the firm to conceal its activities more effectively. Thus, the problems associated with concealment are further compounded by corruption. In general, if bribery occurs, it leads to lower compliance. It must be noted that the mechanism through which bribery affects compliance here is somewhat different from other models. In the prior literature, bribery lowers compliance because the bribe is smaller than the fine (see Polinsky and Shavell, 2001 ). Here bribery lowers compliance because it alters the inspection regime and allows the firm to invest in avoidance more effectively. We have shown that bribery may be eliminated by lowering the frequency of inspections. Thus, the regulator faces a trade-off: a lower frequency of inspections without bribery but with the strong deterrent effect of unannounced regimes, or a higher frequency of inspections with the weaker deterrence associated with bribery. To our knowledge this form of a purely informational bribe, in exchange for a tip-off, has not been analyzed formally in the literature.
Prior work on inspection regimes has examined the optimality of announced inspections taking the form of crackdowns (Lazear, 2006; Eeckhout et al., 2010) . Although these models differ substantially from ours, we show that randomized, unannounced inspections may be optimal for a wide range of inspection technologies when detection avoidance lowers the effectiveness of inspection effort. In particular, with incorruptible supervisors, if avoidance effort lowers the marginal product of inspection effort (i.e., the two variables are substitutes) and inspections are constrained to be less than continuous (i.e., inspections are constrained to happen with a frequency strictly less than one), then the optimal regime necessarily consists of unannounced inspections. Again, with corruptible supervisors, the effectiveness of unannounced inspections may be affected by collusion in the form of a tip-off. However, in our model, a regulator seeking to maximize compliance will not necessarily respond to bribery by announcing inspections. Instead, we show in an example that eliminating bribery without reducing compliance may involve lowering the frequency of unannounced inspections and raising the supervisor's wage. 19 In this paper, we focus on the choice of a regulator who maximizes compliance, taking the fine for violations as given. We do not consider the regulator's welfare maximization problem and in particular, we do not determine the socially optimal level of the fine. The literature has examined these issues by employing models in which the regulator first commits to regulatory parameters, including inspection intensity, and the firm is a second-mover who chooses its avoidance effort with perfect information regarding all regulatory parameters (for instance, Malik, 1990 and Langlais, 2008) . With this formulation, the regulator's welfare maximization problem is tractable and these authors show that whether or not the fine is maximal generally depends on the avoidance technology.
Finally, whereas our paper provides a novel analysis of tipping-off, we do not consider other forms of corruption that may arise in the context of principal-supervisor-agent models. The analysis of bribes in exchange for a favorable compliance report, or suppressing evidence of an unfavorable report, is for the most part well understood. In particular, the literature has emphasized the role played by the supervisor's wage in influencing the size of the gains from corruption (see Mookherjee and Png, 1995 , who analyze ex-post corruption; Samuel, 2009 , for an analysis of both preemptive and ex-post corruption; and Marjit et al., 2000 or Vafaï, 2005 for an analysis of extortion or abuse of authority). We recognize that in trying to prevent tipping-off, the regulator may encourage one of these other forms of bribery, but we leave the analysis of these interactions for future research.
Thus, if m A ≤ m U , compliance is always lower under regime A than under regime U. Since m A is equal to m U (1), m A > m U for all σ ∈ (0, 1) requires that m U be increasing in σ. As Proposition 1 shows, this occurs only when x and m are complements. Thus it cannot hold if (m, x) are global substitutes. However, if m and x are not global substitutes, then at the given σ, compliance may be higher with announced inspections than with unannounced inspections. ∎
Proof of Proposition 2
The results follow almost entirely from Proposition 1. First, and in order to obtain a contradiction, suppose that the optimal regime is announced inspections and σ * < 1. We know from Proposition 1 that g A is strictly increasing in σ. Hence σ could be raised to increase compliance, so that σ * is not optimal. Hence, either σ * = 1 or the optimal regime is unannounced inspections and σ * < 1. Second, if σ * < 1 then it must satisfy the necessary FOC. Using the envelope theorem, the necessary FOC at an interior solution σ * ∈ (0, 1) is σp(m U (σ), x U (σ))f + ∂p ∂m ∂m U (σ) ∂σ = 0, which holds if and only if (m U , x U ) are substitutes and equation (3) is satisfied with an equality. ∎
Proof of Proposition 3
We want to show that (i) lim σ→0 G(σ) = 0 and (ii) lim σ→0 G ′ (σ) < 0. Because G(0) = 0, it then follows that there exists a σ ∈ (0, 1] such that bribery is not profitable for all σ ≤ σ.
To prove (i), in equation (5) we note that m U is finite and the only term which is not multiplied by σ is x U . Therefore, with the assumption lim σ→0 x U = 0, as σ goes to zero, all terms in G(σ) go to zero. Now to prove (ii) it is useful to recognize the following facts: 
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If this expression is negative, then because G(0) = 0 and lim σ→0 G(σ) = 0, it follows that there exists a σ ∈ (0, 1] such that bribery is not profitable for all σ ≤ σ. ∎
Proof of Proposition 4
To prove that the regulator always tolerates bribery if the firm's bargaining power is sufficiently low, note that if α = 0, then g B ≡ g U so that the regulator maximizes compliance by setting σ = σ * . Furthermore, because σ * maximizes g U , for every σ ≠ σ * , g U (σ * ) > g U (σ) holds. Now, for α strictly positive, but sufficiently small, g B (σ * ) = g U (σ * ) − αG(σ * ), which is linear in α. It thus follows that there exists a range of α's for which g U (σ * ) − αG(σ * ) > max{g U (σ), g A (σ)} for everyσ such that G(σ) ≤ 0 (that is, for which bribery is eliminated). Therefore, if the firm's bargaining power is sufficiently low, the regulator tolerates bribery.
Second, we prove that when the firm has all the bargaining power, the regulator eliminates bribery only if (7) is satisfied. To this effect, note that when α = 1, for any σ ′ such that G(σ ′ ) > 0, g B (σ ′ ) = g A (σ ′ ) + max{B, 0}. In contrast, suppose the regulator chooses σ such that G(σ) ≤ 0. If g A (σ) > g U (σ) at the chosen σ, then unless σ = 1, the regulator can improve compliance by increasing σ since g A is strictly increasing in σ. Hence, we may focus on the unannounced regime and thus, condition (7) follows immediately. Finally, if condition (7) does not hold, then the regulator tolerates bribery regardless of the firm's bargaining power. This follows from the fact that g B (σ * * ) is non-increasing in α. Hence, if the regulator tolerates bribery when α = 1, it tolerates bribery for every α < 1.
Finally, suppose σ ′′ is such that G(σ ′′ ) ≤ 0. Then σ ′′ ≠ σ * since we have assumed G(σ * ) > 0. Moreover g U (σ * ) ≥ g U (σ) for every σ ≠ σ * and thus, g U (σ * ) ≥ g U (σ ′′ ). Hence we cannot guarantee that σ ′′ satisfies equation (7) at σ ′ = σ * . Since σ ′′ was an arbitrary element of the set of frequencies such that G(σ) ≤ 0, it follows that a σ satisfying all required conditions does not necessarily exist. ∎ A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T
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Highlights for "Announced vs. Surprise Inspections with Tipping-off," by E. Dechenaux and A. Samuel.
• Regulators face a choice between announcing inspections and using surprise inspections
• We examine the optimal choice of an inspection regime in a model with supervisor moral hazard and costly detection avoidance by the agent
• With corruptible supervisors, bribery for a tip-off lowers the effectiveness of surprise inspections
• While the regulator may be able to eliminate bribery by lowering the frequency of inspections, eliminating bribery does not always result in the highest level of compliance with the regulation
